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Neoliberalization, uneven development, and Brexit: further
reﬂections on the organic crisis of the British state and society
Bob Jessop
Department of Sociology, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
ABSTRACT
Neoliberalization is a variegated series of processes with a core policy
set that comprises: liberalization, deregulation, privatization,
recommodiﬁcation, internationalization, reductions in direct
taxation, and decriminalization of predatory economic activities.
Compared to the era of Atlantic Fordism and Spatial Keynesianism,
neoliberalization promotes uneven development in the name of
competitiveness and pursues policies that largely neglect its
adverse economic, social, and political repercussions. Growing
inequalities of income, wealth and life-chances have been
ascending the political risk agenda and, through works such as
Piketty’s Capital in the twenty-ﬁrst Century, have been
‘conversationalized’. Yet little concrete action occurs to remedy the
results of uneven development in societies undergoing neoliberal
regime shifts. This contribution relates these issues to Brexit as a
symptom of the organic crisis of British society, marked by
manifold economic, political and social crises, and the continuing
failure to address uneven development. The referendum question
falsely posited that Brexiting would resolve many of these
problems. However, the real issue should have been ‘in’ or ‘out’ of
neoliberalism. Failure to deliver the anticipated beneﬁts of Brexit
will interact with the continuing crisis of British society to reinforce
environmental, economic, social, and political crises and provide
further grounds for right-wing populist mobilization.
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My contribution explores the genealogy and development of neoliberalism in its Anglo-
Saxon and European heartlands and relates it to the recent changes in the world
market, the world of states and a still emerging global society. As is common nowadays,
I examine neoliberalization as a variegated, partial and hybridized process (cf. Peck &
Theodore, 2012). I elaborate this approach in two main ways: the ﬁrst is to present a tax-
onomy of neoliberalization; the second is to outline a periodization of one taxon, namely,
principled neoliberal regime shifts in their Anglo-Saxon heartland. The best-known and
most-studied cases of such shifts are the United States of America and United
Kingdom; several others exist, including, most egregiously, Iceland. Next, I suggest that
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neoliberalization is a major driving force of uneven development. Indeed, it is a feature,
not a bug, of the neoliberal project. I examine this within a multi-temporal, multi-
spatial analytical framework. There is an interesting contrast with Ordoliberalism. For,
whereas neoliberalization promotes disruption to boost competition and competitiveness,
Ordoliberalism seeks to achieve these goals by establishing a stable institutional frame-
work. This contrast is reﬂected in the greater propensity of neoliberal regime shifts to
crisis-tendencies, ‘blowback’ eﬀects, and resistance. I illustrate this from the Brexit
process, but other cases are the rise of US populism and the actions (and inactions) of
the Trump Presidency. I conclude with some comments on the likely consequences of
Brexit for the ongoing crisis in Britain’s economy, state, and society.
Neoliberalism and neoliberalization
Given the polyvalence of the core terms, we ﬁnd diverse typologies of neoliberalism and/or
neoliberalization. None is the best entry-point for all theoretical and practical purposes.
For this anniversary issue of European Planning Studies, I begin with its economic and pol-
itical dimensions rather than its pre-history or other salient aspects of neoliberalism. From
this perspective, neoliberalization is an economic, political, and social project that tends to
judge economic activities in terms of proﬁtability and social activities in terms of their con-
tribution to accumulation and seeks to promote this vision through institutional redesign,
encouraging new forms of subjectivity and conduct, and establishing new spatio-temporal
ﬁxes. This interpretation might suggest that it promotes the spontaneous operation of
market forces. However, neoliberalization actually depends on the exercise of political
power to establish and consolidate its various forms and, when confronted with crisis,
to rescue them. As such it involves all three of Max Weber’s types of ‘political capitalism’:
unusual deals with political authority, accumulation through force and domination, and
predatory economic activities (Weber, 2009). Thus one might argue that it entails a
primacy of the political (understood here to include the polity, politics, and policy)
rather than free market as envisaged in ‘theoclassical’ economics. The argument below
builds on this analysis.
Based on theoretical considerations and historical observation, four main forms of neo-
liberalism can be distinguished analytically. These may exist in hybrid forms and, depend-
ing on their contradictory and crisis-prone evolution, diﬀerent forms may also succeed
each other in the same economic and political space.1
First, the most radical form was neoliberal system transformation in post-Soviet succes-
sor states. Russia and Poland provide two contrasting cases: Chicagoan ‘creative destruc-
tion’ induced by neoliberal shock therapy and a more Ordoliberal ‘market therapy without
shock’.
Second come neoliberal regime shifts. Breaking on principle with post-war Atlantic
Fordist class compromise, at least six neoliberal policies were pursued in order to
modify the balance of forces in favour of capital. These policies comprise: (1) liberalization
to promote free market competition or at least greater market competition to the detri-
ment of monopoly or state monopoly competition; (2) deregulation, based on a belief
in the eﬃcient market hypothesis and the prudential, self-preserving instincts of compa-
nies and ﬁnancial institutions; (3) privatization to roll back the frontiers of the polity in
favour of the proﬁt-oriented, market-mediated economy and the eﬃcient allocation of
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resources and dynamic innovative potential that markets are expected to deliver; (4) the
introduction of market proxies in the residual state sector to favour eﬃcient, eﬀective,
and economical delivery of public services, thereby reducing the scope for non-market
logics in the public sector, especially when combined with cuts in state budgets; (5)
reductions in direct taxation on corporate income, personal wealth, and personal
income – especially on (allegedly) entrepreneurial income – in order to boost incentives
for economic agents to earn, save, invest, innovate, create, and accumulate individual
and corporate wealth rather than have the state determine the level and content of the
national output; and (6) the promotion of internationalization to boost the free ﬂow of
goods and services, proﬁt-producing investment and technology transfer, and the mobility
of interest-bearing capital, all with a view to completing the world market. One might add
to this list the decriminalization of ﬁnancial crime (Black, 2014). Thatcherism and Reagan-
ism are well-known cases but similar shifts occurred in Australia, Canada, Cyprus, Eire,
Iceland, and New Zealand. While often identiﬁed with right-wing parties, these shifts
have also been initiated, maintained or backed by centre-left parties, sometimes under a
‘Third Way’ label.
Type three comprises economic restructuring and regime shifts that occurred in
response to inﬂationary and/or debt crises in economies pursuing import-substitution
growth. These changes were imposed from outside by transnational economic institutions
and organizations backed by leading capitalist powers and backed by partners among
domestic political and economic elites in the countries aﬀected. Neoliberal reforms were
a condition for ﬁnancial and other aid to crisis-ridden economies in parts of Africa,
Asia, Eastern and Central Europe, and Latin America. While the second and third types
often pursue similar policies in the (semi-)periphery of the global economy, they have ana-
lytically distinct roots.
Fourth, we observe a more pragmatic, partial, and potentially reversible set of neoliberal
policy adjustments. Not all of the six (or seven) neoliberal economic policies are adopted
in such cases because this type involves more modest and piecemeal changes deemed
necessary by governing elites and their social base(s) to maintain existing economic and
social models in the face of speciﬁc crisis-tendencies and the challenges generated by
growing world market integration. In Europe, the Nordic social democracies and
Rhenish capitalism provide examples. However, such adjustments can cumulate despite
the ﬂuctuating political fortunes of the parties that back them and, as if by stealth, lead
to neoliberal regimes (witness Germany in the last 25 years). Moreover, following the
North Atlantic Financial Crisis (hereafter, NAFC) and the Eurozone crisis, these cumulat-
ive changes have become harder to reverse as global pressures and the approach to crisis-
management in Europe tend to reinforce neoliberalization. This can be seen in eﬀorts to
institutionalize neoliberalism in a succession of pacts and crisis-management responses in
the Eurozone economies. One response is the rise of nationalist and populist blowback in
core and periphery alike.
Periodization of neoliberal regime shifts
Neoliberalization in its Anglo-Saxon heartlands has involved seven main stages to date.
The ﬁrst is its pre-history as an intellectual, ideological and political movement up to
‘the point of no return’, i.e. when the momentum behind a neoliberal regime shift
EUROPEAN PLANNING STUDIES 3
made it highly likely that a political party committed to neoliberal policies would enter
oﬃce with a popular mandate or through negotiations with other parties to form a
coalition government. Stage two sees the formation of a government committed to a neolib-
eral agenda and eﬀorts to consolidate control over the legislature and executive branch in the
face of opposition inside the government itself or from other forces acting within or at a dis-
tance from the state. Consolidation initially focused on shifting the balance of forces through
a mix of short-term concessions, passive revolution, and concerted eﬀorts to win hegemony
or, in extremis, use of police powers to overcome resistance. This process may overlap with
the third stage, namely, attempts to roll back the institutions and institutionalized compro-
mises associated with diﬀerent versions of the Atlantic Fordist post-war settlement. A key
aim of stages two and three was to translate the discursive politics of free markets and a
liberal state into substantive policy initiatives to remove obstacles to the neoliberal
project. Fourth come eﬀorts to roll forward neoliberal institutions, consolidate the shift in
the balance of forces, and constitutionalize neoliberal principles nationally and, where poss-
ible, regionally and globally – making them harder to reverse even were the political con-
juncture to turn temporarily against continued neoliberalization.
The ﬁfth stage was blowback as an unintended but inevitable eﬀect of a one-sided
emphasis on serving mobile export-oriented proﬁt-producing capital and interest-
bearing capital. This led to resistance from disadvantaged capitals, intensiﬁed uneven
development, increasing inequalities of income and wealth, debt-default-deﬂation
dynamics (cf. Rasmus, 2010), and resistance from subaltern groups. This is the moment
of the ‘Third Way’ and analogous attempts to provide ﬂanking and supporting mechan-
isms to maintain the momentum of neoliberal regime shifts.
Stage six was initiated by the irruption of the NAFC. This initially signiﬁed a crisis of
ﬁnance-dominated accumulation regimes but did not produce a crisis of neoliberalism in
the US and UK. Indeed, this only occurred in Iceland, where the weight of the hypertro-
phied ﬁnancial sector far exceeded that in the UK and radical measures imposed the costs
of crisis-management on ﬁnancial capital (Cyprus’s implosion came later as part of the
Eurozone crisis). However, in the ﬁrst two cases, while ﬁnancial capital may have lost
some credibility, it continued to dominate the accumulation regime, the state apparatus,
and, in the USA, the legislature. It could therefore exploit the crisis, ensuring that it did
not, in Rahm Emanuel’s words, ‘go to waste’. Indeed, central banks and states in the neo-
liberal heartlands intervened massively to rescue imprudent and predatory banks that
were deemed too systemically important or too well-connected politically to be allowed
to fail. Toxic assets and losses were socialized at the expense of households, the public
debt, and industrial capital. Financial crisis was translated discursively and practically
into public debt and ﬁscal crises and intensiﬁed neoliberal viliﬁcation of state spending,
with calls for further austerity measures.
Stage seven emerged in the context of the sixth stage. Thanks to its dominance in the
power bloc, ﬁnancial capital was able to manoeuvre to delay, dilute, and otherwise weaken
attempts to re-regulate its operations at the expense of the public purse and future crises.
This created the conditions to transform a crisis of ﬁnance-dominated accumulation into a
crisis in this accumulation regime. At the same time, eﬀorts continued to transform neo-
liberal austerity policies and politics into a permanent, constitutionalized state of austerity
that undermine the institutions and practices of liberal democracy (Bruﬀ, 2014; Jessop,
2016b, 2018). These are partly aimed at limiting and defeating resistance to neoliberalism
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and its eﬀects. This resistance has taken increasingly vocal populist forms marked by
strong exclusionary discourses, practices, and eﬀects. These measures and the new
forms of resistance indicate the continuing primacy of politics in neoliberalization.
The economic signiﬁcance of neoliberalization
Neoliberalization promotes ever more forcefully (and, in many cases, forcibly) the com-
pletion of the world market and the correlative, but increasingly contradictory, subordina-
tion of all social relations to the competitive logic of capital accumulation. Rhetorically, its
proponents aim to overcome the frictions of national boundaries, open national econom-
ies to foreign competition, intensify the global division of labour, and enhance the role of
mobile ﬁnancial capital in equalizing proﬁt rates on a global scale and, indeed, equalizing
the return on all commodiﬁed assets. Ever more rareﬁed forms of ﬁctitious capital (includ-
ing derivatives) are crucial vectors of this process. While the goal of completing the world
market seems to privilege market forces its advancement, consolidation, crisis-manage-
ment, and defence against resistance depend on the primacy of the political. Substantively,
neoliberalization privileges some capitals and spaces over others, enabling them to appro-
priate superproﬁts at the expense of less powerful economic agents and less attractive
spaces. Among other eﬀects, world market integration in the shadow of neoliberalism
enhances capital’s capacity to defer and/or displace the eﬀects of its internal contradictions
by increasing the global scope of its operations, reinforcing its capacities to disembed
certain of its operations from local material, social, and spatio-temporal constraints,
enabling it to deepen the spatial and scalar divisions of labour, thereby expanding oppor-
tunities to relocate across spaces and places and move up, down, and across scales. It also
collapses time horizons by commodifying and securitizing the future. All of these pro-
cesses have their speciﬁc contradictions and crisis-tendencies.
To establish why neoliberal regime shifts, cumulative neoliberal policy adjustments,
and the politics of neoliberalization prove resilient rather than retreat in the face of
their respective crisis-tendencies, we must look beyond their intellectual appeal and dom-
estic and international political backing to the economic logic of neoliberalization. This is
related to the distinction between the use-value and exchange-value aspects of the elemen-
tary form of value, namely, the commodity. The commodity is both a use-value and an
exchange-value: without use-value, it would not be purchased; without exchange-value,
it would not be produced. Analogous properties are found in other forms of the capital
relation. The worker is both a concrete individual with speciﬁc skills, knowledge, and crea-
tivity and an abstract unit of labour power substitutable by other such units (or, indeed,
other factors of production); the wage (including the social wage) is both a source of
demand and a cost of production; money functions both as a ‘national’ currency circulat-
ing within a monetary bloc where it is subject to state control and as an international
money exchangeable against other monies in currency markets; proﬁt-producing capital
is a more or less concrete stock of time- and place-speciﬁc assets undergoing valorization
according to their speciﬁc properties and abstract value in motion (notably as realized
proﬁts available for re-investment); land, deﬁned to include all natural resources, is a
free gift of nature and a monopolistic claim on revenues in the form of rent; knowledge
circulates as part of the intellectual commons and can also become the object of intellec-
tual property rights; and so forth.
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In each case, neoliberalization privileges the exchange-value aspect over the use-value
aspect of a given form of the capital relation. It emphasizes cost reduction and cost recovery
and subjects all economic activities to proﬁt-oriented logic regardless of any negative extern-
alities. This structural privileging of exchange- over use-value not only favours capital over
labour but also beneﬁts hypermobile proﬁt-producing and interest-bearing capital at the
expense of other capitals that are embedded in broader sets of social relations and/or that
must be valorized in particular times and places. Mobile proﬁt-producing capital gains to
the extent that it can plausibly threaten to reorganize its production chains to avoid barriers
to diﬀerential accumulation that arise from state intervention and/or pressure from subal-
tern classes and social movements. This intensiﬁes the inﬂuence of the logic of capital on
a global scale as the global operation of the law of value commensurates local conditions
at the same time as it promotes the treadmill search for superproﬁts that exceed the prevail-
ing world market average rate of proﬁt. The same phenomenon can be seen at smaller scales,
such as the European Union, where a combination of enlargement and increased integration
inside the single market enabled European and, even more, non-European capital to exploit
national, regional, and local diﬀerences and demand ﬁscal, ﬁnancial, or material concessions
to attract investment. In turn, interest-bearing capital is the most abstract and general
expression of exchange-value not only in the capitalist mode of production itself but also
in capitalist social formations more generally. It gains from the full set of neoliberal policies
(including de-criminalization) which facilitate, inter alia, ﬁnancial innovation (e.g. securiti-
zation), unregulated speculation, and predatory ﬁnance. In this sense, compared to the
largely intermediary roles of ﬁnance in Fordist regimes and, likewise, in the much-heralded
(if somewhat lagging or lacking) productivist, post-Fordist knowledge-based economy
(KBE), neoliberalization promotes not a benign form of ﬁnance-led growth but a predatory
ﬁnance-dominated accumulation regime.
Such one-sided treatment can overlook or deny, but not suppress, the signiﬁcance of
the use-value aspects of the above-mentioned forms of the capital relation. Eventually
their vital role in capitalist (and societal) reproduction becomes evident and, absent appro-
priate ways to handle the contradictions between use- and exchange-value, crises emerge
that may forcibly re-impose the unity of the capital relation, typically through a more or
less sudden and destructive process of devalorization. This one-sided treatment also
increases inequalities of wealth and income that undermine demand and also generate
growing popular resistance – issues recognized in largely neoliberal spaces such as the
World Economic Forum as major threats to prosperity, social cohesion, and political stab-
ility and ‘mainstreamed’ by texts like Piketty (2014). But neither crises nor elite hand-
wringing can easily reverse or otherwise redress the structural impact of neoliberal
measures since the 1980s and their juridico-political consolidation through neoliberal con-
stitutionalism and authoritarianism. This would require a favourable balance of forces and
concerted action in a period when mainstream opposition parties and movements have
been weakened and further demobilized by the neoliberal mantra of ‘no alternative’.
This has created the space for extreme populist blowback against neoliberalization.
Neoliberalization and uneven development
Uneven development occurs in all modes of production and social formations but assumes
diﬀerent forms in each. In capitalism, it is shaped by a distinctive political economy of
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time, by disjunctions among labour time, production time, circulation time, turnover time,
and naturally necessary reproduction time within and across diﬀerent sectors, and by the
dialectic of time–space compression and distantiation. While the world market as both the
presupposition and posit of capital accumulation is the ﬁnal frontier and ultimate horizon
of uneven development, the latter is better seen as a series of fractal processes that occur in
self-similar but not identical ways, cross-cutting and interweaving territories, places,
scales, and networks and producing complex multi-spatial and multi-temporal eﬀects
(cf. Jessop, 2016a).
Together these economic and extra-economic mechanisms provide conditions for
uneven production of absolute and relative-surplus value and its redistribution in form
of superproﬁts and quasi-rents tied to spatial and/or political advantages (Hadjimichalis,
1987, 2018). Institutional and spatio-temporal ﬁxes shape the forms and eﬀects of uneven
development, including the scope for combined development. But structural eﬀects and
strategic interventions are mediated in complex, ultimately uncontrollable, ways by inher-
ited institutions, competing strategies, the shifting balance of forces, and creative destruc-
tion. This emphasizes, as Hudson notes, ‘the decisive role of distinctive subnational
couplings of economic structures and modes of governance and regulation’ (Hudson,
2003, p. 50).
The pattern of uneven development varies with the diﬀerential articulation of econ-
omic, political and social spaces into a variegated world market. For example, there is a
signiﬁcant contrast between the heartlands of Atlantic Fordism in its heyday and
today’s neoliberal heartlands regarding strategies and policies towards uneven develop-
ment. Atlantic Fordism was associated with measures to limit and/or compensate for
uneven development (e.g. through spatial Keynesianism, cf. Brenner, 2004). The political
and policy focus in this period was on creating the conditions for a Fordist dynamic (with
signiﬁcant variation among economies in the circuits of Atlantic Fordism), integrating
national economic space, generalizing norms of mass consumption, and spreading the
beneﬁts of Fordist growth through infrastructural investment, collective bargaining, col-
lective consumption, and welfare state measures. This required measures to compensate
for the uneven sectoral, regional and social impact of post-war growth to promote the vir-
tuous cycle of Fordist accumulation. In contrast, the rise and consolidation of neoliberal
regimes was marked by neglect of uneven development and/or measures to reinforce it by
actively freeing market forces. These measures involved rolling back policies and appara-
tuses concerned to counteract uneven development and rolling forward policies and reor-
ganizing apparatuses to support sectoral and regional winners rather than to sustain losers
or compensate sectors or regions that lose from the new neoliberal strategy. Two related
aspects of this approach are: identify cities and regions that can serve as national (or EU-
wide) champions; and induce, persuade or force declining regions to compete on neolib-
eral criteria for limited funds that might facilitate regeneration. Both aspects intensify
uneven development, especially when declining regions are blamed for their own
decline, required to make themselves attractive to capital based on mobilizing their own
resources, or left to rot. More generally, whether promoting strong competition based
on dynamic eﬃciency or weak competition based on a race-to-the bottom, global, Euro-
pean, national, regional, and local competitiveness took precedence over inter-regional
and societal cohesion. This is because the neoliberal policy set prioritizes exchange-
value and the rights of capital over hard-won economic, juridico-political and social
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rights for workers and citizens or a broader sense of national solidarity. Its destructive
impact is reinforced by accumulation through dispossession (especially the plundering
of public assets and the intellectual commons to beneﬁt capital), regulatory arbitrage,
and the limited mobility of productive capitals that have to be valorized in particular
times and places.
Uneven development in the United Kingdom
Neoliberal measures since 1979 reinforced the ongoing pattern of de-industrialization and,
where core industries survived, contributed to their balkanization, i.e. their splitting up
among rival foreign capitalist interests. Successive governments have declared Britain to
be ‘open for business’ (and takeover), leading to competing and uncoordinated ties to
foreign capital, including, recently, Chinese, Indian, and Russian interests alongside ‘the
usual suspects’. Without the economic, political, and social bases for a concerted national
economic strategy, Britain’s economic fortunes came to depend heavily on the vagaries of
ﬁnance-dominated accumulation and the wider world market and a low-skill, low-tech,
low-wage, and even zero-hour service sector associated with a neoliberal race to the
bottom. The combined impact of general macro-economic policies and speciﬁc micro-
economic measures to restructure nationalized industries (which were over-represented
in the ‘north’) plus government investment projects that have favoured London and the
Rest of the South-East2 have regional implications. It has beneﬁtted the City of London,
and rentier and producer service interests located in London and the South-East (Martin,
1988;Martin, Pike, Tyler &Gardiner, 2015; Peck&Tickell, 1992) plusmobile transnational
capital, and high-tech industries. Marginal and poor localities in dynamic core cities,
notably London, and regions have gained from their ties to the dynamic and internationa-
lized core. Regions and third-tier cities and towns outside London and the Rest of the South
East, especially where the decline or closure of traditional industries has not been countered
by the rise of new sectors and where public services have suﬀered fromwithdrawn subsidies
and other neoliberal austerity measures. Overall, this has generated far more job losses in
manufacturing (both in absolute and relative terms) in the ‘north’ of England and the pro-
vinces than in the ‘south’. The resulting divergent set of regional economies with marked
diﬀerences in economic structure, sectoral composition and trade performance continues
to constrain eﬀorts to ‘take back control’ of the British economy.
These problems are aggravated by the historical weakness of the British state and its
inability to pursue a serious economic strategy consistently and eﬀectively. Post-war
growth in other advanced economies had been secured with more or less good results
in dirigiste regimes, corporatist regimes, and liberal regimes (Shonﬁeld, 1965).
However, the British state (understood in Gramscian terms as ‘political society + civil
society’)3 lacked the capacities to engage in statist intervention, eﬀective corporatist
coordination, or a consistently rigorous laissez-faire line. Its interventions therefore oscil-
lated uneasily among the three strategies that all failed in their diﬀerent ways in diﬀerent
conjunctures, thereby reproducing Britain’s ‘ﬂawed Fordist’mode of growth (Jessop, 1980,
1992; Jessop, Bonnett, Bromley, & Ling, 1988). A weak state meant that eﬀorts to promote
re-industrialization, develop a competitive service sector, and modernize the wider society
failed. In contrast, de facto or principled laissez-faire has enabled the City to thrive in a
deregulated and international environment.
8 B. JESSOP
Indeed, while key aspects of the post-war social democratic and Conservative ‘One
Nation’ post-war settlement have been rolled back, neoliberal policies have not provided
the basis for a new national accumulation strategy or stable ‘popular capitalist’ social basis.
Instead neoliberalization has promoted the deeper integration of (parts of) British econ-
omic space into the circuits of international ﬁnancial capital and advantaged international
proﬁt-producing capital. The ever more visible polarization of wealth and income, the
intensiﬁed pattern of uneven development, and the shift from a welfare to a workfare
state are generating discontent (reﬂected most recently in the Brexit referendum). This
in turn prompts measures to monitor the population, insulate government from
popular demands for economic and social justice, encourage divide-and-rule tactics,
and, whenever necessary, repress dissent.
Historical context and conjunctural shifts
While ﬁnancialization in the UK has been boosted by neoliberalization, it has deep histori-
cal roots. This reﬂects the City of London’s distinctive role as the leading international
ﬁnancial centre for international ﬁnancial transactions. Financial capital (in the intercon-
nected forms of money-dealing capital, stock-dealing capital, and interest-bearing capital)
has long been dominant in the British power bloc (cf. Ingham, 1984). This is reﬂected in
the dominance of neoliberal policy paradigms at diﬀerent sites in the state apparatus and
political regime. While the City of London has changed, with domestic banks and ﬁnancial
institutions ceding primacy to international ﬁnancial institutions and with interest-
bearing capital becoming more important than commercial capital, the City remains a
key force in the power bloc and key factor in uneven development. It has gained
inﬂuence due to ﬁnancial innovation, increasing its leverage, and thanks to its massive
internationalization. This weakens the ties between the interests of leading sections of
the British power bloc (if, indeed, one can still talk of a British power bloc) and the devel-
opment of British economic space as a whole. It has also weakened the ties between the
power bloc and British working class, reinforced by the decline of traditional heavy indus-
try, retail capital, and small and medium enterprises, all of which lack the capacity to chal-
lenge the hegemony of ﬁnancial capital.
The growing split within the Establishment and wider society since the 1950s concerns
the UK’s relationship to Continental Europe and the EU and the alternatives such as
Atlanticism, globalism, and protectionism. There is also a crisis of authority rooted in
the decline of deference, loss of conﬁdence among the ruling classes, and recurrent
state failure. The recent legitimacy crisis results from the failure of successive neoliberal
projects, pursued under Conservative, New Labour, and coalition governments alike, to
deliver sustainable nationwide prosperity. The representational crisis is evident in a
growing disconnection between the natural governing parties in Westminster, party
members, and their voters. This created the space for the rise of left and right populism,
for Corbynism as a social movement opposed to the Blairite rump of MPs who control the
parliamentary party, and, of course, for the disaﬀection shown in the Brexit vote. The
legitimacy and representational crises were exacerbated by the loss of control over
public opinion, which is the hinge between political and civil society, over continued
EU membership. This was due in part to the hostility of much of the British press.
Finally, there is a wider organic crisis in the social order, reﬂected in contestation over
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‘British values’, disputed national and regional identities, north–south and other regional
divides, the metropolitan orientation of intellectual strata, and generational splits.
Overall, the combination of weak state capacities in the period of ﬂawed post-war econ-
omic expansion and the subsequent pursuit of neoliberal strategies has produced a
seriously weakened ‘real economy’ and hypertrophied rent-seeking ﬁnancial sector.
Thus, successive governments have failed to provide adequate technical and vocational
training to address labour shortages, to protect worker and union rights to limit the
race to the bottom and spur productivity-boosting capital investment, to encourage
R&D to promote the knowledge-based economy, to overcome the housing crisis and
reduce the unproductive ‘housing sector borrowing requirement’, to fund the National
Health Service rather than sustain the military–industrial complex or reduce corporate
and top-rate taxes, and to moderate uneven regional development. After the irruption
of the NAFC, New Labour responded with measures to bail out the ﬁnancial sector
and, as a result, transformed a ﬁnancial crisis into a ﬁscal crisis marked by rising public
sector deﬁcits, which were ruthlessly exploited by the Conservative Party, City of
London, and right-wing press to discredit New Labour’s hard-won reputation for econ-
omic competence. Cameron built on this economic, political, and intellectual failure to
pursue a harder neoliberal line. And, despite her initial rhetorical critiques of the economic
and social injustices of past policies, repeated on the steps of 10 Downing Street on becom-
ing Prime Minister, the austerity state is surviving under Mrs May’s premiership and the
new Chancellor (Philip Hammond) is committed to further austerity to build reserves
against possible economic and ﬁsco-ﬁnancial problems during the negotiations or follow-
ing Brexit.
Financialization, Thatcherism, New Labour, and neoliberalism
A 1989 report in the Bank of England’s Quarterly Bulletin questioned the beneﬁts of
London’s role as an international ﬁnancial centre. It noted:
There may of course be disadvantages in hosting a major ﬁnancial centre. Salaries and wages
may be forced up, thus driving up rents and house prices, with undesirable social conse-
quences. Regional disparities may be exacerbated and the congestion of local transport
systems may be aggravated. The economy may face risks due to over-dependence on a
single sector. The operation of monetary policy may become complicated by the need to
nurture the ﬁnancial sector. Regulation may need to be more complex than otherwise.
Finally, it has sometimes been argued that the ﬁnancial sector merely preys on the rest of
the economy, adding to costs and distorting other markets – by, for instance, attracting
able individuals who might be more socially productive in other areas such as manufacturing
(Davis & Latter, 1989, p. 516).
Having noted this danger, the authors quickly responded that, ‘on balance, the ﬁnancial
sector may be judged to offer substantial net beneﬁts to the economy’ (ibid.).Yet these
worries were well-founded. Indeed, the feared tendencies have intensiﬁed in the last
three decades and entrenched the UK economy’s dependence on international ﬁnance.
Uneven development has been reinforced to the beneﬁt of London and the detriment
of other regions. In short, the problems that became evident in the ﬁnancial crisis in
2007–8 and continuing economic decline did not emerge out of the blue. The City of
London has seen increasing internationalization and ever-closer integration into the
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global circuit of capital. Regulatory arbitrage played a key role here, when, following the
‘Big Bang’ that liberalized and deregulated ﬁnancial capital, London could become the
leading international centre for international ﬁnancial capital. Indeed, it is noteworthy
that many of the biggest ﬁnancial scandals that have transpired in 2007–2018 were gen-
erated through activities in the City, regardless of the nationality or primary seat of the
ﬁnancial institutions involved.
Moreover, by privileging owner occupation in the hope of electoral beneﬁt, successive
governments boosted the ﬁnancial services sector. This skewed investment towards sectors
that serviced the consumption boom (retailing, distribution, personal ﬁnancial services
and credit, equity release) based on ﬁctitious credit. This increased the mass and share
of proﬁts going to interest-bearing capital at the expense of proﬁt-producing capital
that creates internationally tradable commodities. In turn, this aggravated the crowding
out eﬀects of the housing sector borrowing requirement on productive investment, and
discouraged regional labour mobility from areas of high unemployment to areas of
labour shortage.
This illustrates on a national scale the more general observation of Martin and Gardiner
about the multi-scalar eﬀects of what I describe as neo-liberal ﬁnance-dominated
accumulation:
The ﬁnancial crisis revealed the boom for what it was, a form of development that was highly
unbalanced: on a global level, between creditor and debtor nations (especially China and the
USA respectively); within the Eurozone, between the strong core members such as Germany
and France, and the weaker peripheral members such as Spain, Italy and Portugal; and within
countries, between consumption and investment, between services and production, between
state revenues and spending, between rich and poor, and, spatially, between diﬀerent cities
and regions. For while the ‘long boom’ between the early 1990s and 2007 may have lifted
most regions and cities, it lifted some much more than others. Indeed, in some instances
(the UK is a particularly prominent case) it reinforced regional inequalities (Martin & Gar-
diner, 2018, p. 25).
Brexit
[The Brexit vote] was a singular event that is but one symptom of a continuing organic crisis
of the British state and society and a stimulus for further struggles over the future of the
United Kingdom and its place in Europe and the wider world (Jessop, 2017, p. 133).
This claim illustrates Gramsci’s observation that a crisis is ‘a process and not an event
(Gramsci, 1995, p. 219). Its course and outcomes depend on how crisis symptoms are con-
strued and managed. Europe and the European Union have long been a neuralgic point of
division inside the Conservative Party and within the establishment more widely. In this
sense, the decision to run a referendum on Brexit and its result were symptoms of an
organic crisis. The referendum result did not resolve this crisis but reproduced it in
new guises.
This can be seen in the failure of the British state, the ruling party, business interests, or
organized labour to develop a coherent negotiating position in the following two years. It
was six months after the referendum vote, on 29 March 2017, that the oﬃcial letter
required under Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty to formally notify the European Commis-
sion of the UK government’s intention to withdraw from the European Union. The delay
was not spent working out a negotiating position or preparing an exit strategy in the case
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of no deal. In contrast, the European Union prepared a tough negotiating position. Nego-
tiations began on 19 June 2017, 11 days after the 2017 General Election, which, far from
giving the Prime Minister, Theresa May, a strong mandate, saw her losing her majority
and dependent for a majority on the support of Northern Ireland’s hard-line Democratic
Unionist Party MPs, which gave them a veto over decisions on the border issue and future
relations with the Irish Republic. Negotiations focused ﬁrst on the ‘divorce’ bill before
post-Brexit arrangements could be discussed. After several unplanned delays, a fudged
agreement on the conditions for discussing the ﬁnal settlement and post-Brexit transition
arrangements was reached in late December 2017. Some issues were agreed, others left
ambiguous, and some postponed. The latter included the border arrangements between
Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. Discussions on this and other issues began on
19 March 2018. The Cabinet committee charged with preparing the UK’s negotiating pos-
ition failed to reach agreement in time for the June summit of the European Union. A
negotiating position was eventually agreed at a full Cabinet meeting on 6 July 2018,
based on fudging the government’s redlines on sovereignty, trade, and free movement
and ‘cherry-picking’ on customs arrangement for agricultural and manufactured goods
while leaving services outside any future deal. Whether the negotiating position holds
within the government and ruling party before negotiations begin was unclear as this
article was ﬁnalized on 7 July 2018. It could well do so because time is short to secure a
deal before the dead line and no deal would mean there is no transition period – only a
cliﬀ-edge exit for which the government has not prepared. Even before this, growing
realization of the diﬃculties of exiting from a 45-year entanglement with the European
Union led to a contested agreement on a 21-month-long ‘transitional’ arrangement
during which little will change substantively. Accordingly, Brexit proper is due to
happen eventually on 1 January 2021, which is four and a half years after the referendum.
The weakness of a neoliberalized state apparatus has much to do with these delays. The
state, as argued above, has been unable to act in an eﬀective dirigiste, corporatist, liberal
(or, more recently, neo-liberal) manner. Muddling through on a week-by-week basis
while trying diﬀerent grand strategies is its modus operandi. The stark divisions within
parliamentary parties, national parties, and the electorate on the issue of Brexit and its
most suitable form have reinforced this. And, surprisingly, given how signiﬁcant Brexit
is for the prospects of business and ﬁnance, it has taken two years for major commercial,
industrial, and ﬁnancial interests to articulate their positions in public. In part this reﬂects
the fact that the Balkanization of the UK economy means that there is no signiﬁcant
national or comprador bourgeoisie that could beneﬁt from Brexit and that the multiple
international linkages of capital also block a coherent stance. So, there is no collective
voice of capital (apart from the plea for certainty) and it has taken almost two years for
individual capitals, fractions, and sectors to begin to voice worries and begin special plead-
ing. But this situation also reﬂects the toxic nature of pro-Brexit tabloid media reaction to
any gain-saying of the ‘will of the people’, whether this gain-saying comes from the
Supreme Court, the House of Lords, Cabinet members, Members of Parliament, respected
think tanks, or other signiﬁcant forces. This reﬂects the continuing hegemonic crisis in the
power bloc, representational crises rooted in partisan dealignment, electoral volatility, and
disaﬀection with politics, and crises of authority and legitimacy.
In addition, cumulative budget cuts and staﬀ reductions in the civil service over 40 years
have left the state without qualiﬁed staﬀ to prepare serious impact reports on the
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implications of Brexit on speciﬁc sectors, regions, generations, and the wider society; like-
wise, it lacks suﬃcient personnel who understand the diplomatic, legal, ﬁnancial and econ-
omic aspects of trade negotiations, which have long been delegated to the European
Union, to present a clear Brexit strategy. These deﬁcits matter because the European
Union has a strong rechtsstaatlich (constitutional and legal) orientation such that nego-
tiations occur within the framework of the Treaties, legal rules, and conventions and over-
seen by the Court of Justice of the European Union, which is charged with ensuring equal
implementation and enforcement of the treaties, laws, and rules. Maintaining the legal
integrity of the European Union, even as its range of activities expands in new directions
following the Eurozone crisis, the rise of internal divisions on migration, and the Trump-
induced, multi-faceted fractures in transatlantic unity, is crucial to its overall operation.
The redlines set out in the government’s initial negotiating position, notably regaining
national sovereignty over laws, trade, and borders, threaten the legal identity of the Euro-
pean Union and limit possible Brexit outcomes. The British common law tradition has
encouraged collective misapprehension on this point within parts of the British establish-
ment and the pro-Brexit media, leading them to interpret Brussels’ redlines as a rejection
of compromise and attempt to ‘punish’ Britain for its temerity in voting to leave the Euro-
pean Union. Similar eﬀects stem from the commitment to a nineteenth-century notion of
national sovereignty in an increasingly integrated planet earth, world economy, and world
of states that has recognized the need for – always contested – forms of governance to
address supranational threats, challenges and crises.
Much of what passes for ‘negotiation’ on the UK side… has involved a desire to retain the
beneﬁts of EUmembership while shrugging oﬀ the status and responsibilities of membership.
But when Mrs May appeals for ‘a comprehensive system of mutual recognition’ she is going
still further. She is not asking for something that applies within the EU. She is asking for
something that even EU Member States do not expect of each other. A ‘comprehensive
system of mutual recognition’ is not found within the EU. Mrs May is asking that the UK
be treated better than a Member State of the EU (Weatherill, 2018).
Yet these complexities are ignored because, as Wren-Lewis notes, ‘Brexiteers believed they
owned the referendum victory, and so acted as if they had the right to decide what Brexit
means’ (2018). Following the referendum, the British public have been regularly informed
that ‘Brexit means Brexit’, that the government is committed to securing the ‘best Brexit
for the whole of the United Kingdom’ and that ‘No deal would be better than a bad deal’.
These anodyne assertions are a smokescreen for cluelessness on how to deliver Brexit and,
even after agreement on the government’s negotiating position in July 2018, there is no
certainty that it will prove acceptable to the EU negotiators or the remaining member
states. Some commentators are speculating that Brexiteers hope that they will reject it,
so that a ‘clean Brexit’ on World Trade Organization terms would eventually ensue.
Apart from the Department for Exiting the European Union (DExEU), no department
had Brexit as its top priority or a major priority in its Single Department Plan for 2017/18
ﬁnancial year. This situation remains for 2018/19. Even departments whose briefs will be
most impacted by Brexit have not integrated it into their priorities but mention it as a con-
sideration relevant to their priorities (Lloyd, 2018; more generally on lack of preparation,
see Owen, Lloyd, & Rutter, 2018). This is compounded by the paralysis of the Conservative
Cabinet, parliamentary party, and grass-roots members, who are overwhelmingly elderly
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Brexit supporters. As the deadline for an agreement approaches, the room for manoeuvre
is shrinking (e.g. the issue of the Irish border, the problems of reconciling national auton-
omy with the complementary but diﬀerent requirements of continued membership of the
customs union (which bans internal tariﬀs) and single market (which includes freedom of
movement as well as freedom in the ﬂow of goods), the possibility of separate deals on
goods and services, the special status of London as an international ﬁnancial centre for
international ﬁnancial capital, ﬁsheries and agriculture, and so on). There is also miscal-
culation about the speed and ease with which new free trade deals can be negotiated with
other governments, each of which has its own negotiating agenda. A signiﬁcant irony in
the present situation is that, by and large, the advocates of hard Brexit lack expertise in
many of these topics, thanks to a naïve understanding of national sovereignty that is inap-
propriate to a world of interdependent states and thanks also to a blind Ricardian faith in
the virtues of free trade among nations premised on comparative advantage that is inap-
propriate to a world of just-in-time commodity chains and ﬁnance-dominated accumu-
lation. Conversely, those who have expertise in these matters are largely opposed to
Brexit in general and cannot, in any case, design a form of Brexit that is impossible in prin-
ciple or, if it were feasible, cannot be delivered within the current time-frame (e.g. regis-
tration of aliens, customs software, trade negotiations). The point has been reached when
there are not enough funds, staﬀ, political clarity, or time to exit the EU on schedule, even
on a ‘clean Brexit’, no deal basis, following World Trade Organization rules. This helps to
explain the steady series of concessions to the EU negotiating redlines, such as the divorce
bill, the granting of EU citizens full rights during the transition period, the ‘backstop’ plan
for keeping Northern Ireland in the customs union and single market in the absence of any
other arrangement acceptable to Ireland and the European Union more generally, no new
trade deals to be implemented before 2020, and so on.
Ian Dunt’s conclusions on the Brexit process shortly after the referendum remain valid:
Britain’s government is approaching Brexit ineptly, misjudging its opponent, underestimat-
ing the challenges and prioritising its short-term political interests over the long-term inter-
ests of the country. Our ministers have thrown away their leverage and failed to neutralise the
advantages held by the EU. Through a mixture of ignorance and ideological frenzy, they are
driving Britain towards a hard, chaotic Brexit (Dunt, 2016, pp. 154–50).
Uneven development after Brexit
Whatever the outcome of the Article 50 negotiations, Brexit will not reverse the historical
legacies of uneven development. On the contrary, it is likely to worsen the situation for the
Northern peripheral regions, where there was strong support for Brexit, relative to the City
and the UK’s southern core (Lavery, 2017, p. 39; see also Clarke, Goodwin, & Whitely,
2017). This can be seen in four areas: the trade eﬀects of Brexit, the loss of EU structural
funds and other regional support, and the regional economic impact of likely economic
regress and falling government revenues. Overall this will damage Brexit-supporting
regions and Brexit voters more than Remain-supporting regions.
First, the export base of London and the rest of the South East is far more internatio-
nalized than that of other UK regions and therefore less exposed to the impact of declining
trade with the EU (Los, McCann, Springford, & Thissen, 2017). This reﬂects the economic
and ﬁnancial base of the South compared with the rest of the UK. Between 1993 and 2007,
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output in banking and ﬁnance increased by 180 per cent whilst manufacturing (upon
which Northern economies remained more heavily reliant) saw increases of only 11 per
cent (Martin, 2010, p. 37). London is the only city region to have exceeded pre-crisis
levels of per capita output and is the only region to have increased employment in the
ﬁnancial sector since 2009 (Lavery, 2017). One consequence is that, whereas EU
exports account for 7 per cent of London’s gross product, other regions, notably in the
North and South-West, depend far more heavily on EU markets and, indeed, the level
of local dependence increased between 2000 and 2010 in 34 of the UK’s Nuts-2 regions
(Los et al., 2017, p. 789). In addition, as major manufacturing ﬁrms are now emphasizing
publicly, their commodity chains are integrated with the EU and will be disrupted by
tariﬀs, new customs frictions, and sterling devaluation. For example, the Society of
Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SSMT) reports that 20–50 percent of components
in the automotive sector are sourced from the EU (SSMT, 2014, p. 6). In contrast,
London and the South East have seen decreasing reliance on EU demand in this period.
The Brexiteers response that components could be sourced more cheaply from the
world market and that competitive pressure would force EU suppliers to reduce prices
ignores the complexities of trade deals and supply chains. Recognition of this risk
seems to have informed the compromise negotiating position reached on 8 July 2018,
which aims for a customs partnership in agricultural and manufactured goods.
Second, there will be a severe post-Brexit loss after of EU grants supporting UK insti-
tutions, cities and regions, and economic activities and replacing them through UK
funding will diminish the much-vaunted ‘Brexit dividend’. Regarding uneven develop-
ment, EU structural funds have gone disproportionately to ‘less developed’ and ‘transition’
regions, such as the SouthWest, Wales, Yorkshire and Humber, the North East, and North
West.4 For example, seven of the ten local economic partnerships that received the most
structural funding were located in the North; the South was home to all of the ten partner-
ships that received the lowest level of funding (Hunt, Lavery, Vittery, & Berry, 2016, pp. 6–
7).5 Local authorities in rural areas also predict massive detriment as unaﬀordable homes,
poor connectivity, skills gaps and health inequalities will threatening their future success
and prosperity (Carroll, 2018).
Third, if there is no Brexit dividend, which is the most likely outcome according to cal-
culations about the impact of all four possible Brexit scenarios from hard Brexit through a
bespoke deal to the softest of Brexits (Global Future, 2018), this will limit the funds avail-
able to the UK government to cushion the impact in peripheral regions, cities, and towns
and to assist their regeneration. The research by Jonathan Portes and associates for the
Global Future think-tank found that even a bespoke deal, the government’s preferred
option, would have a net negative ﬁscal impact of about £40bn a year. Government
reports indicate similar results.
Fourth, recent research by the Institute for Public Policy Research (Lloyd, 2018) and the
Oliver Wyman consultancy (2018) have established that a hard Brexit would hit the cost of
living for those outside Londonmore because of their lower household incomes and the com-
position of their purchases of goods and services, which are more exposed to tariﬀ increases
(e.g. meat and dairy products) or prices increases due to devaluation (oil and gas). Overall,
gains from importing 150 goods and services from agreeing free trade deals with all other
countries in the world market will not compensate for the increased cost of imports from
the European Union under any of the four Brexit scenarios (Oliver Wyman, 2018).
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Conclusions
There is no pure case of neoliberalism, nor of the four types identiﬁed in my taxon-
omy. The British case is closest to a principled neoliberal regime shift and is an impor-
tant case for the proposed periodization of such shifts into seven stages to date.
Nonetheless, every case also has special features in general and in each stage. This is
clearly so for the United Kingdom. The background to the post-war crisis is Britain’s
‘ﬂawed Fordism’, the dominance of ﬁnance capital economically and in the power bloc
(Establishment) even during the heyday of Fordism, and a state that lacked the
capacities to engage in eﬀective corporatist, dirigiste, or liberal intervention in
pursuit of a coherent accumulation strategy or state project. This provided the distinc-
tive context for the principled neoliberal regime shift, pragmatically preﬁgured in the
dying days of the 1975–79 Labour Government, that achieved its ‘point of no
return’ or take-oﬀ moment in 1978. Subsequent stages of neoliberalization aggravated
rather than reversing the ﬂawed development of the British space economy, worsening
its uneven development, and creating the conditions for the ﬁnancial crisis. The latter
in turn intensiﬁed the organic crisis of the state even as it provided an opportunity to
strengthen the dominance of ﬁnancial capital and extend neoliberalization. Yet auster-
ity, uneven development, and disillusion also prepared the ground for the referendum
vote for Brexit, the consequences of which include a continuation of the organic crisis
of the British state, further uneven development, and Brexceptionalism. It seems as if
the Brexit referendum was the hinge between ‘a failed state’ and ‘a state intent on
failure’ (cf. Younge, 2016).6 For an incapable government presiding over an ineﬀective
state that has failed to plan for no deal and is more fearful of pro-Brexit media barons
wielding power without responsibility than the sotto voce opposition of business and
ﬁnance has sought to reclaim sovereignty without being able to able to exercise it
eﬀectively, let alone in the public good.
Notes
1. This taxonomy draws on Jessop (2016b, 2018).
2. Witness the 2012 Olympic Games, the Cross-Rail project in London, and the third Heathrow
runway.
3. Cf. Gramsci (1971, p. 261).
4. Projects supported by the European Regional Development Fund created 44,331 jobs in
Wales in the 2007–2013 funding round; other job creation ﬁgures were 20,149 (Yorkshire
and Humberside), 20,602 (North East), and 29,795 (North West) (Hunt et al., 2016, p. 7).
5. There are 39 LEPS in total in England.
6. I owe the wonderful quotation from Gary Younge to MacLeod and Jones (2018). Younge
actually described Britain as ‘cutting the ﬁgure not so much of a failed state as a state
intent on failure’. The quotation was too good not to use again but I amended the quotation
and his extended coda to better reﬂect the argument developed in this article.
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